Prof. Raymond Kuo at MIRC: March 26th Minnesota International Relations Colloquium, UMN Political Science Department

We will be hosting Prof. Raymond Kuo (Fordham University) at MIRC on March 26th. Prof. Kuo will be presenting his co-authored paper titled "The Causes and Consequences of Joint Military Exercises." Pedro Amaral will be providing discussant comments.
You can find the abstract for the paper below, and email us for a copy of the paper. The talk will be at the usual MIRC time and place: 3:30-5:00 in Lippincott Room. Coffee will be provided.
We hope to see many of you there,
MIRC organizers
The Causes and Consequences of Joint Military Exercises
Multinational military exercises are among the most common demonstrations of military cooperation and intent. On average, one is initiated every 2.5 days. But when do they lead to interstate hostility and war? We argue that, by themselves, joint military exercises (JMEs) increase the risk of conflict. However, alliances neutralize this effect by providing formal channels to constrain military adventurism by partners. Using a two-stage model on dyadic data of JMEs from 1977 through 2003, we find that states bound by 1. an alliance pact, 2. an alliance with high levels of institutionalization, and 3. an alliance with conditional obligations are indeed more likely to conduct JMEs. Additionally, after isolating the effect of JMEs, we find that they increase the risk of war, but not when conducted by allies.

We will be hosting Prof. Raymond Kuo (Fordham University) at MIRC on March 26th. Prof. Kuo will be presenting his co-authored paper titled "The Causes and Consequences of Joint Military Exercises." Pedro Amaral will be providing discussant comments.
You can find the abstract for the paper below, and email us for a copy of the paper. The talk will be at the usual MIRC time and place: 3:30-5:00 in Lippincott Room. Coffee will be provided.
We hope to see many of you there,
MIRC organizers
The Causes and Consequences of Joint Military Exercises
Multinational military exercises are among the most common demonstrations of military cooperation and intent. On average, one is initiated every 2.5 days. But when do they lead to interstate hostility and war? We argue that, by themselves, joint military exercises (JMEs) increase the risk of conflict. However, alliances neutralize this effect by providing formal channels to constrain military adventurism by partners. Using a two-stage model on dyadic data of JMEs from 1977 through 2003, we find that states bound by 1. an alliance pact, 2. an alliance with high levels of institutionalization, and 3. an alliance with conditional obligations are indeed more likely to conduct JMEs. Additionally, after isolating the effect of JMEs, we find that they increase the risk of war, but not when conducted by allies.