Wednesday, July 29, 2015

Greek Festival Aug 22-23, Saint Paul, MN

Aug 31 enRoute to a Global Mindset: Global Business Savvy

enRoute to a Global Mindset: Global Business Savvy

This past year, enRoute attendees have learned the art of networking and diplomacy, how to communicate effectively, and build self-assurance in an international setting. Now, we are finishing out the year at Surly Brewing Company with an exciting enRoute to Global Business Savvy – information on how to assess the risks of doing business internationally and how to succeed in the global market. There will be a short panel discussion, small group conversation, a Q & A period, time for networking, and of course, beer tasting!

The panel discussion will feature Anne D’Angelo, Assistant Dean of Global Initiatives at the Carlson School of Management at the University of Minnesota; Donovan Walsh, Founder of The Financial Services Consulting Group, a management consulting firm; and John Walthour, Vice President of Consumer Insights at UnitedHealth Group. Our panelists have more than 20 years of experience in international education, development, finance, and marketing.

Caux Scholars Program - Asia Plateau

The Caux Scholars Program - Asia Plateau is accepting applications for this year’s winter program which takes place from 20 December 2015 to 10 January 2016. Applications are due by September 15, 2015!

Program Overview: 
The Caux Scholars Program - Asia Plateau (CSP-AP) is a three week peacebuilding and sustainable development institute for young leaders. It invites youth leaders, community organizers, and scholars from different countries and cultural backgrounds to learn and experience the integration of sustainable development and peacebuilding, including with issues such as trauma healing, human rights and gender, restorative justice, and non-violent action. CSP-AP also aims to instill principled leadership by focusing on introspection and personal understanding, and interfaith and intercultural experiences. In addition to theoretical approaches to conflict, peace and development, the program aims to develop practical skills in negotiation, building local capacity, applied theatre in peacebuilding, community mobilization, and understanding cultures. Our goal is to endow young people with a sophisticated multi-cultural and global perspective on peace and development--and to equip future leaders with the inspiration to be the change they want to see in the world and the practical skills to do so.
Applicant requirements: 
Be between the ages of 18 and 35 • Have a high level of academic achievement • Demonstrate leadership qualities and commitment to public or community service • Exhibit interest in the ethical dimensions of world affairs • Possess openness to a multi-cultural learning experience • Two letters of recommendation • 500-word essay describing why you would like to participate in this program • Application form is available at our website:

This material is cross-posted from the Peace and Collaborative Development Network, and appears to be an interesting opportunity for the Humphrey community.   This is meant for information sharing purposes only. 

IBTCI seeking an Admin/Finance Mgrs 5 year MMEMS project (Mozambique)

 IBTCI, Seeking Administrative/Finance Managers, USAID/Mozambique Monitoring & Evaluation Mechanism and Services (MMES) project

International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc. (IBTCI), a U.S. based international development consulting company established in 1987, has worked in over eighty-five countries and has implemented over one hundred and fifty projects. IBTCI has served governments, private sector companies and several donor agencies in the practice area of Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) across many sectors including education, health, economic growth and democracy & governance.
IBTCI is currently seeking an Administrative/Finance Managers for an anticipated 5 year Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism and Services (MMEMS) project in Mozambique, funded by USAID. This will be a full-time office position based in Maputo, Nampula, and/or Quelimane. MMEMS will provide a range of technical assistance to USAID Mozambique's portfolio of programs.
Job Duties:
  • Maintains administrative staff by recruiting, selecting, orienting, and training employees; maintaining a safe and secure work environment; developing personal growth opportunities.
  • Accomplishes staff results by communicating job expectations; planning, monitoring, and appraising job results; coaching, counseling, and disciplining employees; initiating, coordinating, and enforcing systems, policies, and procedures.
  • Provides supplies by identifying needs for reception, switchboard, mailroom, and kitchen; establishing policies, procedures, and work schedules.
  • Provides communication systems by identifying needs; evaluating options; maintaining equipment; approving invoices.
  • Purchases printed materials and forms by obtaining requirements; negotiating price, quality, and delivery; approving invoices.
  • Completes special projects by organizing and coordinating information and requirements; planning, arranging, and meeting schedules; monitoring results.
  • Provides historical reference by developing and utilizing filing and retrieval systems.
  • Improves program and service quality by devising new applications; updating procedures; evaluating system results with users.
  • Achieves financial objectives by anticipating requirements; submitting information for budget preparation; scheduling expenditures; monitoring costs; analyzing variances.
  • Maintains continuity among corporate, division, and local work teams by documenting and communicating actions, irregularities, and continuing needs.
  • * Maintains professional and technical knowledge by attending educational workshops; benchmarking professional standards; reviewing professional publications; establishing personal networks.
  • Contributes to team effort by accomplishing related results as needed.
Tracking Budget Expenses, Staffing, Quality Management, Managing Processes, Organization, Coaching, Communication Processes, Disciplining Employees, Motivating Others, Promoting Process Improvement, Reporting Skills
If interested, please email your updated resume, summary of qualifications, and any questions/concerns to either or 

This material is cross-posted from the Peace and Collaborative Development Network, and appears to be an interesting opportunity for the Humphrey community.   This is meant for information sharing purposes only. 

US citizens fluent in Mandarin Chinese sought for Consular Adjudicator positions

We are currently accepting applications for Consular Adjudicator LNA - Mandarin positions.

Read the vacancy announcement for more information, and to start the online application process. Please note that the deadline to submit completed applications is August 12, 2015.

Consular Adjudicator LNAs serve on the front lines of a U.S. Embassy or Consulate and are critical to America’s national security. CA LNAs conduct one-on-one interviews and review supporting documentation to determine if a foreign national meets the requirements for entry into the United States. Requires exceptional English grammar and fluency in Mandarin.

All potential applicants are strongly urged to read the entire vacancy announcement to ensure that they meet all of the requirements for this position before applying.

Applicants must be U.S. citizens and at least 20 years old to apply. They must be at least 21 years of age to be appointed. Applicants must also be available for worldwide service, and be able to obtain all required security, medical and suitability clearances.

Visit our forums if you have any questions, or to search for topics of interest. The forums can be found under Connect on the website. You can also search our FAQs for more information.

We appreciate your interest in the U.S. Department of State.

CALNA Mandarin Header

MINN seeking membership manager

Open Position - MINN Membership Manager

MINN currently has an opening for a paid hourly MINN Membership Manager position.
The MINN Membership Manager oversees MINN’s Professional and Student paid membership program including utilizing Salesforce (a CRM) to manage operations and correspondence; maintain a monthly membership renewal cycle; and to compile data for reports. This position represents membership interests when collaborating with MINN’s other committees and Managers, such as Education and Networking events, Communications, the annual MINN IDEA Summit and when liaising with the MINN Board.

For an in-depth description, see the complete posting at the Minnesota Council of Non-Profits.

Tuesday, July 28, 2015

Humphrey's Carnegie Scholar Touhtou co-authors peice on Morocco & human rights, with Prof Ron & HHH's Golden

For Moroccan rights groups, good reputations aren’t enough

This piece lead-authored by Carnegie Fellow to the Humphrey School Rachid Touhtou appeared today in English, French and Arabic:

reprinted below:

Without building a strong popular base, the Moroccan human rights community cannot capitalize on its good reputation. A contribution to openGlobalRights’ Public Opinion and Human Rights debate. Français,  
On February 20, 2011, thousands of Moroccans took to the streets in Rabat, Casablanca, and Tangier, demanding wholesale change to the country’s constitution. The protests were led by the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH), a Rabat-based organization founded in 1979 by secular, left wing activists and former political prisoners.

AMDH leaders had begun strategizing for political change as soon as the Arab Spring began in Tunisia, two months earlier. They created a Facebook page, a new website, and a YouTube video calling on Moroccans to turn out en masse on February 20. In response, more protestors hit the streets than the country had witnessed since major social uprisings in the 1980s.

The AMDH’s initial success is puzzling. According to the Human Rights Perceptions Polls, based on a representative sample of 1,100 adults living in Rabat, Casablanca, and their rural environs, Moroccan rights groups have a weak social base. Although the public does afford local human rights organizations (LHROs) some trust, they have little personal contact with these organizations.
Consider Figure 1, which charts the public’s trust in LHROs, relative to their trust in other institutions. On a 4-point scale, in which 1 equals “no trust”, adults living in and around Casablanca and Rabat rated LHROs at 2.32, on average. This is lower than the most trusted actors—the army and religious institutions—but much higher than trust in the least trusted institution, the US government.
As Figure 2 demonstrates, however, the Moroccan human rights organizations’ contact with the broader population is very infrequent, suggesting that LHROs would struggle to mobilize large numbers. Only 7% of our sample reported ever having met a “human rights worker” (non-governmental or governmental), and only 1% reported ever having participated in the activities of, or donated money to, a human rights organization.
Despite this weak social base, however, the AMDH was able to play a pivotal role in the February 20th mass mobilization. It did this by making a crucial alliance with the Justice and Charity Organization (JCO), an Islamist social movement in Morocco that traces its roots to the 1970s.
According to a recent study, the JCO has up to 500,000 followers; according to its leaders, the real numbers are even higher. Most observers agree that the JCO has built a broad social base in Morocco through close, frequent contact with the public, strong ideological principles, and attention to organizational detail.

Unlike the AMDH and other secular Moroccan human rights groups, which focused on elite-level, anti-regime activities during the “Years of Lead”, Morocco’s repressive 1970s and 80s, the JCO spent its time building ties to ordinary Moroccans. It trained leaders, cultivated sympathizers and devoted time and effort to its popular base.

The Human Rights Perception Polls provide a measure of the ideational context in which the JCO thrives. As Figure 3 demonstrates, 96% of Moroccan survey respondents reported that religion was “very important” in their daily lives; 85% prayed at least once a day, and 46% attended mosque at least once a week. In addition, 27% said they trusted Moroccan religious institutions “a lot”, according it 4 on the 1-4 trust scale. Religion, in other words, is crucial to Moroccans, and the JCO has positioned itself squarely within that worldview.
Given the JCO’s popular strength, it was crucial that, in February 2011, the AMDH reached out to the Islamists and, in the heat of the moment, built a temporary coalition of convenience. That winter, the joint AMDH-Islamist demonstrations created a powerful street presence, undermining the king’s confidence in his power. 

Morocco’s monarch quickly adapted, announcing far-reaching concessions that few had expected. Mohammed VI paved the way for a constitutional monarchy by reducing his powers, changing Article 19 of the old constitution (which defined the king as a sacred personality), and stressing the primacy of universal human rights over domestic law.

The AMDH rejected the king’s concessions, saying they didn’t go far enough. Instead, they and other secular rights activists called for wholesale reconstruction of the state’s governing institutions, including forming a popular assembly to replace the parliament and drafting a new constitution. Although the AMDH did not openly call for the king’s removal, the suggestion was that, under the new system, the king would become little more than a figurehead.

In a sudden turnabout, the religiously-oriented JCO bolted from its alliance with the secular AMDH and decided to demobilize. Instead, the JCO joined forces with the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), a political party that had accepted the king’s reforms. The reasons behind this sudden about-face remain unclear, but some speculate the JCO struck a deal with both the PJD and the king, abandoning street protests in return for free and fair elections.

The JCO is a social movement, not a political party, but their alliance with the parliamentary PJD is mutually beneficial. In November 2011, when the PJD emerged as the leader in national elections with 27% of parliamentary seats, the JCO was the PJD’s silent, but willing, partner.

The PJD’s political gains are real. Under the new Moroccan constitution, rewritten by the king in the summer of 2011, the monarch was obliged to select a member of the PJD, as the largest political party, to form the next government. In early 2012, the PJD gained control over major government ministries, including social affairs, economics and foreign affairs.

The PJD is thus gaining valuable government experience while proving itself to Moroccan voters. It has also demonstrated its ability to work with the monarchy and earn the king’s trust. For the JCO, the alliance with a successful Islamist political party has provided all manner of benefits, including a mechanism for transitioning into a more overtly political role should it decide to do so in the future.

The AMDH and other secular rights activists, by contrast, have emerged weakened from the process. The AMDH and other secular rights activists, by contrast, have emerged weakened from the process. Although they continue to organize weekly protests, their numbers are small and declining. The AMDH has not been successful in advancing its agenda of wholesale government reform, further reductions in monarchical power, poverty reduction, unemployment alleviation, and more. Most importantly, from the AMDH’s perspective, they have not been able to gain a royal pardon for their former leftist comrades in arms.

There seem to be several lessons for the Moroccan human rights movement. First, some kind of accommodation with the palace appears crucial for political impact. The Islamists chose to strike a deal, and have been rewarded with power and access. By remaining steadfast opponents to the king, the AMDH has been shut out.

More importantly, the AMDH’s inability to sustain a broad-based social movement without the Islamists demonstrates the weakness of their long-term strategy. Although the Human Rights Perceptions Polls do show popular trust in LHROs, good feelings alone cannot sustain a movement. Instead, Morocco’s rights groups must cultivate a robust social base by providing social services and popular education, and by raising money from ordinary members of the public.
Failing these efforts, the Moroccan human rights movement is likely to tread water. The Islamists are growing more powerful, while the Ministry of Interior has just banned several AMDH conferences, threatened to strip the group of its legal status, and demonized the NGO as anti-Islamic and anti-national.

The time has come for a strategic rethink. The Moroccan human rights movement registered some real successes in the 1990s and 2000s. It put human rights on the monarchy’s agenda, forced the state to recognize past abuses, and advocated successfully on a range of issues. The movement’s reputation among ordinary Moroccans, moreover, is reasonably strong.

Without actively cultivating a broad popular base however, Morocco’s local rights groups are destined to remain marginal political players.

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